Sola Scriptura's Black Box

Private Judgement and Faith

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THE ARTICLE

Annoyingly, many of the discussions between Protestants and Catholics are held under a strange veil of confusion. Each side can share their burden of the blame, but what is most fruitful is to move forward and to continue to discover where differences truly lie, what arguments one believes resolves the controversy for their side, etc.

Here, I hope to give a good example of this by explaining in greater detail one of the arguments commonly given against Protestant authors by Catholic Theologians, i.e., the argument from “private judgement,” which has been a favorite of many generations of Catholic slop posters, and has equally been the ire of many Protestants engaged in equally sloppy responses.

But, what does this argument actually imply? Here are some notes I am collecting…they are quite disorganized and have not reached a synthetic stage of maturity

First Clarification: It is important to recognize that the reception of a judgement is not a judgement in the sense intended by the authors. For the Church to give their judgement that “scripture teaches that the Pope is infallible,” there is not required an additional judgement to receive this judgement.

Second Clarification: There are two degrees of distinction between judgements. Either the judgements are formally the same judgement (i.e., the same subject and predicate), yet distinct as more or less clear, or the judgements are formally distinct, the one judgement only virtually contained in the other judgement. In the second case, there is a process of discursive reasoning (proper illation) whereby a conclusion is drawn from a certain judgement by means of a minor premise. In this case, the reasoning of the individual has entered in as a true and proper objective medium of knowing the conclusion in the premise.

As an example of the first, the judgement “John is a man” and “John is a rational animal” differ only as less and more distinct insofar as “man” is identical conceptually to “rational animal” differing as definition and thing defined. There is a certain sense in which the reasoning of knower enters into this improper illation as a certain subjective medium of knowledge.

As an example of the reason, the judgment “John is a man” and “John is risible” differ as two formally distinct judgements with a conceptual distinction between “man” and “risible,” unlike the above example. The medium of this reasoning is somewhat on the part of the object and somewhat on the part of the subject insofar as, while there is a certain identity between the major premise and conclusion known by means of the minor premise, there is also a certain objective difference insofar as the conclusion formally expresses what the major premise only virtually contains, being made actually knowable by the minor premise (rather than simply known as in the case of the first example).

I speak more about this distinction here, here, here, and here.

Third Clarification: From this, we are able to distinguish between three forms of “scriptural judgements,” those that are express judgements, those that are formal-confused, and those that are merely implicit/virtual. The first type of judgement states some thing distinctly and clearly in such a way as to be easily apprehended by the hearer, “Isaac is the father of Jacob.” The second type of judgement states something that is a clarification of a judgement formally present in scripture, “the Word was made flesh” to “the Word became a rational animal.” The third type of judgement properly deduces a conclusion through the medium of a minor premise that is more than explicative/exegetical, “Christ is perfect man” to “Christ has beatific knowledge.”

As was presented in the first clarification, to receive a clear judgement from another is not to “privately judge” that thing. Private judgement only enters when our reasoning enters into the fray as some sort of medium of knowing the conclusion. Hence, Catholic theologians will frequently state that the denial of clear expressions of scripture are heretical (e.g., St. Thomas in ST.I.Q32.A4) and the clear expressions of scripture are de fide themselves without a definition of the Church (e.g., Lapide: De fide est gryphes esse, esseque aves, patet ex hoc loco Scripturae).

Fourth Clarification: While it is clear that those things expressly stated in Scripture do not need private judgement to affirm (since the judgement is already contained in Scripture in a way that does not need the reasoning of the subject as a medium of knowing the conclusion, but is properly known through the medium of the infallible proposition with the intellect merely receiving the judgement), the same cannot be said for the second and third categories outlined above.

In both the second and third cases, there is some sort of process of discursion that occurs, whether it is merely explanatory or exegetical (improper illation) whereby the confused is made distinct or it is truly deducting, making actually knowable what is virtually contained in the major premise (proper illation). It is inescapable that either of these two cases involves “private judgement” and goes beyond the receptivity of the the first case.

Hence, the proper matter of private judgement would be to make express what is confused and to make explicit what is implicit.

Fifth Clarification: Here, it is possible to go in two direction depending on whether one sides with the Thomists or the Scotists on the issue of the nature of privately drawn theological conclusions.

The Thomists argue that the presence of private reasoning as a true medium of knowledge in drawing conclusions makes it so that such a medium cannot enter into the assent of faith without it going beyond the motive of faith that we believe “because God reveals who can neither decieve nor be decieved,” bastardizing it into “becauase I have reasoned from what God reveals who can neither decieve nor be decieved.”

The Scotists argue that what the Church is to the “average man” the reason is to the theologian. Hence, while it is not strictly necessary for the Church to propose what is confused or virtual for it to be believed by someone, it is morally necessary in light of the end of the Church to communicate the message of Sacred Scripture to all men, which contains many things that require the second or third degree and are necessary for salvation.

While the first position seems to be the more correct one, either position can proceed against the Protestant position.

Sixth Clarification: Now, as to the scriptures, there are three points of agreement as to those objects necessary for salvation.

First, both Catholics and Protestants state that everything necessary for salvation is contained in scripture, whether implicitly or explicitly, “Sacred Scripture, whether explicitly or implicitly, contains in its entirety whatever is necessary for all unto salvation.” (Walenburch, Compendium Controversiarum Particularium, ch. 5)

Second, both Catholics and Protestants state that there are things necessary for salvation that are not expressly contained in Scripture so as to be plainly understood by all, “Sacred Scripture does not contain in express words or equivalent terms, in an evident and necessary sense, everything that is necessary for all unto salvation.” (Georg Calixtus, Epitome Theologiae, prol.)

Third, a fortiori, not everything necessary for the mission of the Church in carrying out her end is expressly contained in Sacred Scripture, which is broader than those things simply to be believed.